A recent trend involves exploiting various informationhiding techniques to empower malware-for example, to bypass mobile device security frameworks or to exfiltrate sensitive data. The authors provide an overview of information-hiding techniques that can be utilized by malware. They showcase existing and emerging threats that use different types of datahiding mechanisms (not just those adopting classical covert channels), with the goal of monitoring these threats and proposing efficient countermeasures.
IT PROFESSIONAL
Historically, cryptography has been a more widely discussed topic than steganography, especially in law enforcement. In the past, the mere existence of encrypted communications and data would have raised suspicions, but it is a frequent scenario today. For example, malware using encrypted communications for command and control (C&C) purposes might previously have stood out from regular network traffic, but now it is effectively hidden within the "background noise" of routinely encrypted data exchanged in the network. Nevertheless, encrypted communications can be detected relatively easily, and ancillary techniques-such as traffic analysis or metadata recovery-allow for at least some intelligence to be derived from encrypted data and communications. The recovered metadata (such as who is communicating with whom, when, and for how long) can be as or even more important than knowing the actual content.
Currently, encryption is receiving greater attention from security professionals, law enforcement, and security and intelligence agencies. For example, recent advancements in understanding how malicious software encrypts its own communications could help identify and block C&C communications of botnets. 6 Unfortunately, criminals or extremists are well aware of the increased focus on encryption and are looking for other ways to make malicious software stay under the radar, especially in the context of stealing data (where triggering some form of defense must be avoided). In this vein, the most important and recent trend is to equip malware with informationhiding capabilities, or techniques that hide communications. 7 This article provides an overview of information-hiding techniques that can be utilized by malware. By using real-world examples, this article showcases existing and emerging threats using different types of data-hiding mechanisms (not just those adopting classical covert channels). The research presented here was performed within the Criminal Use of Information Hiding (CU-Ing) initiative (http://cuing.org), which was formed with the cooperation of the Europol European Cyber Crime Centre (EC3) to gather experts from different backgrounds with the aim of monitoring information-hiding-capable threats and proposing efficient countermeasures.
COVERT CHANNELS AND DATA HIDING
Cyberattacks are commonly divided into five phases: 8 reconnaissance (gathering information), scanning the target, gaining access to the target, maintaining access, and covering the tracks. Information-hiding techniques are mostly applied in phases 2 to 4, on which we focus here. Figure  1 shows the classification of information-hiding techniques and how they are used by malware in different attack phases. Figure 1 . Classification of information-hiding techniques. C&C: command and control.
As depicted in Figure 1 , information hiding is a very broad term. It encompasses different subdisciplines (or domains), which can be used by an attacker during different attack stages depending on what is subjected to hiding, including the following.
• Identities. The identities of communicating parties are hidden by anonymization techniques. • Communication. The fact that a communication is taking place is hidden by steganography techniques. The characteristics of a network conversation (for example, a packet flow) can be concealed using traffic-type obfuscation methods. • Content. Hiding the content of data but not the transmission or presence of the data itself is achieved by applying cryptographic algorithms. • Code. The structure of (executable) code is hidden by (binary) code obfuscation and masquerading techniques.
First, let us discuss the most important (from our perspective) data-hiding methods-those that conceal the fact that a communication is taking place. Typically, this type of information hiding is realized using some form of steganography.
Historically, the earliest computer steganographic methods were focused on different media types, especially digital images. For example, several algorithms hide information within the least-significant bits (LSBs) of color definitions of pixels within an image, as the human eye cannot spot such alterations. A similar approach has been used for audio and video. The natural evolution is to hide data in network transmissions, such as in inter-arrival times of packets or in unused fields of protocol headers. Network traffic provides the advantage of a continuous data flow, which a digital media file of constant size cannot provide. When secret data is hidden in network traffic, the secret communication channel is referred to as a network covert channel.
In essence, network covert channels enable secret malware communications over any type of computer network, be it a local area network or the Internet. Compared to encryption, which only ensures the confidentiality of what a malware communicates, covert channels can help keep the communication secret and to retain access to a hacked system. Moreover, control protocols can be used on top of covert channels, representing a form of C&C channel. Such control protocols allow attackers to upload a newer version of a malware binary, to select a different encryption or covert signing scheme, to switch from one steganographic method to another, or to apply dynamic overlay routing to bypass firewalls. 9 Malware can also apply network covert channels to conceal the exfiltration of organizational data over the network and to bypass firewalls by hiding data in transmissions that are not affected by its filtering policy. These goals especially affect phases 2 and 3 (gaining/maintaining access). Note that when referring to malware trying to communicate covertly or abuse some network service, the hacking community often uses the term "tunneling." However, this is not accurate because tunneling hides traffic as a byproduct, and actually refers to the encapsulation of network data of the same or higher layer-for example, IPv4 as payload in an IPv6 packet.
While steganography aims to hide data inside digital objects, two other classes of methods obfuscate information in code (code obfuscation) or network traffic (traffic-type obfuscation). Obfuscation is different from steganography-the latter tries to communicate secret data in a nonnoticeable manner while the former is directly visible to an analyst. Despite their different strategies, both domains share the goal of hiding data. The goals of traffic type and code obfuscation affect phase 1 (scanning), but mainly affect phases 2 and 3 (gaining/maintaining access).
Anonymization provides a means of communication without revealing private attributes of the communicating peers, such as their names, IP addresses, or geographical locations. In contrast to steganography, anonymization relies on different techniques-such as spoofing the IP address of a sender or cryptographic algorithms-to fake or hide sensitive data that can be used to deduce information about the parties involved in a communication. Note that, as shown in Figure 1 , cryptographic methods can be used to encrypt any kind of secret data, not just data that reveals identities. Thus, the application of cryptography is not limited to anonymity techniques. Anonymity techniques can be utilized during phases 1 (scanning) and 3 (maintaining access), while encryption (despite its use for anonymity purposes) affects phases 2 and 3 (gaining/maintaining access).
INFORMATION-HIDING MALWARE IN THE WILD
Here we present several examples of information-hiding malware observed in the wild. Because of space constraints, we focus only on the most representative threats observed from 2011 to 2017.
Originally, information-hiding techniques were implemented only in advanced persistent threats (APTs) like Duqu, Regin, or Hammertoss-the most sophisticated types of malware created with the support of nationwide sponsors. However, information-hiding techniques are slowly becoming the de facto standard for "ordinary" malware. For example, various types of popular threats like ransomware (TeslaCrypt, Cerber, and SyncCrypt) or exploit kits (Stegano/Astrum, DNSChanger, and Sundown) use some form of information hiding. Examples of existing information-hiding malware are summarized in Table 1 . More recently, we observed the use of information-hiding techniques for malvertising (malicious advertising) attacks as evidenced by the AdGholas malware. AdGholas avoids detection by using steganography for hiding encrypted JavaScript code in images, text, and HTML code. At the end of 2016, large-scale attacks related to the online e-commerce platform Magento revealed the use of image steganography to conceal payment card details. Once the platform was infected, the malware collected payment details and hid them inside images of real products available on the infected e-commerce site. By downloading such modified images, the attacker could easily exfiltrate the stolen data.
Malware Posing as Other Legitimate Applications or Mimicking Their Traffic Behavior
Some malware relies on the mimicry of legitimate programs and/or their communications. A paradigmatic example is a variant of Android/Twitoor.A-malware that spreads by SMS or malicious URLs. The malware impersonates a pornography player or an MMS application but without the correct functionality, eventually tricking the user to install the application and spread the infection. Another application, Irongate, is the first notable example designed to operate in industrial control systems scenarios. One of the most important features is its ability to record several seconds of ordinary, legitimate traffic from a programmable logic controller and then use it as a smokescreen (in other words, the malicious commands are masked using legitimate ones) when sending intentionally modified data back. Such an operation allows the attacker to alter a controlled process without raising any security alerts. Another example is Fakem RAT, which made its C&C traffic look like MSN and Yahoo Messenger or HTTP conversations.
At the beginning of 2017, Carbanak/Anunak demonstrated its ability to abuse Google cloudbased services to set up a covert channel for C&C purposes. In this case, a unique Google Sheets spreadsheet was dynamically created to manage each infected victim. The use of a Google service granted attackers the ability to stay under the radar because such third-party services are typically not blocked in the enterprise network and are considered safe. Another example includes a new version of SpyNote Trojan, which was disguised as a legitimate Netflix application. Once installed, it allowed the attacker to execute different actions, such as copy a user's files, view a user's contacts, and eavesdrop on a user's communication.
A technique called domain fronting is gaining a lot of attention, especially among APT-related groups. Put briefly, it is used to mask the true destination of a connection by mimicking legitimate traffic to an innocent destination. A successful implementation exploits HTTPS traffic to communicate with an infected host, making the traffic look like a Google search. Instead, the traffic is produced by a connection exchanging data with the attacker.
Information Hiding in Ransomware
The first instances of using ransomware to hide information were discovered at the beginning of 2016 when TeslaCrypt was spread using the Neutrino exploit kit. Neutrino initially redirects users to a malicious landing page crafted for discovering the victim's vulnerabilities to deliver the most appropriate exploit. If the vulnerability is successfully exploited, a downloader is executed.
To gather data, it contacts a server, which responds with an HTTP 404 error page that embeds C&C commands in the HTML comments tag.
In mid-2016, Cerber was identified as one of the macro-type malware-delivered ransomware across a variety of cloud-based file-sharing applications. To spread the infection, Cerber uses a decoy document which, when opened, loads a malicious macro-code that downloads a JPEG file to the targeted machine. Inside this benign-looking image is the steganographically embedded malicious executable.
In August 2017, a similar technique was discovered with the SyncCrypt ransomware. Infected emails contain Windows Script File (WSF) attachments posing as court orders. If opened, malicious code downloads a digital image containing the core components of SyncCrypt.
Information Hiding in Exploit Kits
Information-hiding methods have become so popular among cybercriminals that they are now incorporated within exploit kits to allow developers with little or no programming skills to create, customize, and distribute malware. The first example of this is the Stegano/Astrum exploit kit, which was used in 2016 as part of a huge malvertising campaign. Malicious code is embedded within banner ads by modifying the color space of the used PNG image (the alpha channel). Then, the victim's browser parses an injected JavaScript code, extracting the malicious code and redirecting users to the exploit kit landing page. The infection is performed on the landing page, typically by using several Flash vulnerabilities.
DNSChanger, another type of malvertising exploit kit identified in 2016, hides an AES encryption key within an innocent-looking ad to decrypt the network traffic generated by the exploit kit. The scope of DNSChanger is to launch brute-force attacks against the network routers to take control of the victim's network and inject ads in all exchanged traffic.
While Stegano/Astrum and DNSChanger are niche products, the Sundown exploit kit is one of the major players in the exploit kit market. Sundown uses steganography in two ways: to covertly exfiltrate information stolen from the infected system in PNG files (which are uploaded to an Imgur album where cybercriminals can access them undisturbed-see the CryLocker ransomware campaign as an example) and to hide the exploited code delivered to the victims.
THE ROAD AHEAD
We have experienced a massive growth in cybercrime in recent years, and this trend is likely to continue because it can be so lucrative. 3 We see the following main developments in cybercrime: increased stealth, commoditization of malware, and exploitation of Internet of Things (IoT) devices. Cybercriminals will place more emphasis on making it harder to detect and trace back malware to its origin, which will be a main driver for the increased use of information hiding.
Because a main goal of malware developers is to always remain one step ahead, they will continually try to improve their information-hiding techniques. One avenue is to utilize better digital media steganography algorithms. Improved algorithms, which are harder to detect and eliminate, are already available and known among academics (for example, F5 10 and HUGO 11 ). Another strategy is to hide information in new services or protocols such as Skype, 12 BitTorrent, and Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP). 13 When these are targeted, the result is a "needle in a haystack" problem when it comes to detecting covert communications among a large number of similar connections.
Another future direction is to exploit the ongoing IPv4 to IPv6 transition. Malware can take advantage of misconfigured nodes or hosts with IPv4-only stacks that are unable to process IPv6 malicious traffic. Malware also increasingly exploits the diffusion of HTTPS by hiding in HTTPS or Transport Layer Security (TLS) traffic, which cannot be easily inspected (researchers claim that one-third of malware already uses HTTPS). 14 Botnets will remain an important tool for cybercriminals for various purposes, such as managing distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks or sending spam emails. Because bots can be relatively easily identified by observing the C&C traffic, masquerading this traffic is very important. While most existing approaches are simple (for example, C&C protocols hide in HTTP, IRC, or DNS), researchers recently demonstrated how to completely transform a C&C protocol to mimic another innocuous protocol. 15 Future botnets might utilize overlay networks that use only steganographic methods to communicate (stego-botnets). 16 The DNS protocol is a natural choice to hide C&C traffic or for data exfiltration as it cannot be blocked. Developing stealthier covert channels on top of DNS and developing the countermeasures to detect these channels is an ongoing arms race 17 that could become even more interesting once the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) are more widely deployed.
Future attacks will target the ever-increasing number of IoT devices, such as networked sensors, CCTV cameras, smart TVs and DVRs, smart home and building appliances, and industrial control systems. In many cases IoT devices are soft targets, as their processing capabilities limit the implemented security mechanisms and the low cost of many of these devices means that security is often an afterthought for manufacturers. Attacks on IoT devices also allow user profiling and maliciously interfering with the physical world. Moreover, malware can utilize the IoT to hide secret data. 18 For instance, an attacker can secretly store data in unused registers of IoT devices or by slightly modifying actuator states. 19 Currently deployed steganography methods are often simple, mainly because current protection solutions (such as intrusion detection systems) hardly detect any form of steganography in practice. Thus, malware developers are not forced to apply more sophisticated steganography. Nevertheless, recent threats often merge simple covert channel techniques with memory-resident or fileless implementations to make them stealthier and able to cover their tracks on the infected host-for example, in the filesystem.
However, data loss prevention (DLP) solutions increasingly aim to detect steganographic transmissions. This will force malware authors to improve the covertness of their data-leakage techniques. That said, cybercriminals will increasingly choose off-the-shelf malware rather than develop custom malware, which would require more financial investment. Once more advanced steganography finds its way into off-the-shelf malware products, such as exploit kits, it will become widely used at relatively little extra cost to the cybercriminals.
When the volume of more sophisticated malware increases, malware de-obfuscation and steganography analysis must be done in a more systematic and efficient way. Frameworks for distributed and automated malware analysis like the Malware Analysis and Storage System (MASS) could be a suitable approach for handling large volumes of malware samples retrieved from honeynets. 20
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Modern malware has become so efficient that it can remain covert for a long time. Even if steganographic techniques are not the main reason for this efficiency, the ability to create and exploit covert channels for C&C and exfiltration purposes surely plays a role (for example, Regin went undiscovered from 2008 to 2014). This fact is exacerbated by a worrying lack of techniques for detecting information-hiding threats, especially regarding the IoT and automation. A possible cause is the poor generalizability of the process of detecting information hiding. Many detection techniques are tightly coupled with specific hiding methods, the cover they use, the scenario in which they are used, and the technology on which they depend.
Because creating new hiding methods by applying known techniques to new protocols, scenarios, and technology is relatively easy, countermeasures are always at least one step behind. Therefore, industry and academia should focus on the development of new and general tools or add-ons for the most common network security solutions. One idea is the use of new and more general indicators, such as patterns used by different hiding techniques or energy consumption.
Information hiding increases the complexity of addressing cybersecurity. Organized initiatives like CUIng can be the incubator where a long-term cure for information-hiding malware is developed, as modern cyberthreats require a multidisciplinary approach with the collaboration of many experts from industry, academia, and law-enforcement agencies.
